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RIO FOR USDEL IAEA

FOL REPEAT IAEA VIENNA 7567 ACTION SECSTATE INFO USERDA HQ WASHDC USERDA HQ GERMANTOWN SEP 10, 1976

QUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL IAEA VIENNA 7567

DEPT PASS IO/SCT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, PARM, IAEA

SUBJECT: IAEA DRAFT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR NON-NPT STATES

TOR HOLVINI I BITTL

REF: STATE 212616

- 1. SUMMARY. MISSION HAS RECEIVED LATEST SUBJECT DRAFT AND HAS POUCHED COPIES. MISSION'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON DRAFT ARE PROVIDED. END SUMMARY.
- 2. MISSION HAS RECIEVED FROM IAEA LATEST SECRETARIAT DRAFT, DATED 25 AUGUST 1976, OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR NON-NPT CONFIDENTIAL

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STATES. THIS VERSION INCORPORATES CHANGES

RESULTING FROM UK COMMENTS ON EARLIER DRAFT.
COPIES HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO OES (KRATZER),
ACDA (VAN DOREN) AND ERDA (AMMONS). MISSION
UNDERSTANDS FROM IAEA (D.A.V. FISCHER)
THAT SECRETARIAT WILL TAKE COPIES OF THIS
DRAFT TO RIO AND THE DG IN HIS GENERAL
CONFERENCE SPEECH PLANS TO MENTION AGENCY'S
WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT WITH ANY STATE INTERESTED
IN CONSIDERING ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

3. DRAFT AGREEMENT IS IDENTICAL TO INFCIRC/153
IN MOST OF ITS ARTICLES. THE DIFFERENCES REFLECT
THE NON-NPT STATUS OF A STATE ENTERING INTO THE
AGREEMENT; THE INCORPORATION OF SOME OF THE
SUPPLIER STATE CONDITIONS APPEARING IN RECENT
INFCIRC/66 TYPE AGREEMENTS, E.G., ARTICLE 14 ON
PHYSICAL PROTECTION; THE OBJECTIVE OF THE AGENCY
TO ENSURE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD NOT APPEAR
MORE ATTRACTIVE TO STATES CONSIDERING THE CHOICE OF
THIS AGREEMENT AS OPPOSED TO ADHERING TO NPT; AND
THE DESIRE OF THE AGENCY TO INCLUDE SOME PROVISIONS
IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE THE
AGENCY WITH NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY FOR AT LEAST
THE FIRST SUCH AGREEMENT COMING BEFORE THE BOARD
FOR ITS APPROVAL.

4. MISSION BELIEVES DRAFT CONTAINS NUMBER OF MAJOR DEFECTS AND SOME MINOR ONES, MOST OF WHICH RESULT FROM DESIRE TO GO BEYOND INFCIRC/153 BY BRINGING FACILITIES, SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT, SPECIFIED MATERAL AND RELEVANT TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION WITHIN SCOPE OF AGREEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, AS NOTED IN PARA 3.A REFTEL, ARTICLE 12 SPECIFIES CERTAIN CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET IF THE STATE CONCERNED INTENDS TO TRANSFER SUCH ITEMS OUTSIDE THAT STATE, BUT FAILS TO INCLUDE ANY MENTION OF SUCH ITEMS IN THE DETAILED INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PROVISIONS IN PART II OF THE AGREEMENT (ARTICLES 91-96). IN ADDITION, EXCEPT FOR REFERENCES TO FACILITIES, THERE IS NOTHING MENTIONED IN THE

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PROVISIONS IN PART II SPECIFYING THE DETAILS OF THE REPORTS SYSTEM (ARTICLES 59-69) ABOUT SUCH ITEMS, AND THE SAME IS TRUE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS IN PART II REGARDING INSPECTIONS (ARTICLES 70-89). FURTHER, WITH RESPECT TO FACILITIES, THERE IS NOTHING IN ARTICLE 76 WHICH SPECIFIES ACCESS WHICH INSPECTORS CAN HAVE TO FACILITIES NOT RPT NOT CONTAINING NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE IS ALSO LACK OF PRECISION AS TO WHAT VERIFICATION AND ACCESS RIGHT INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE FOR FACILITIES BETWEEN TIME AGENCY OBTAINS DESIGN INFORMATION AND TIME FIRST NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING REPORT IS RECEIVED BY AGENCY. MOREOVER, IN PRACTICE WE UNDERSTAND AGENCY HAS SOMETIMES RECEIVED DESIGN INFORMATION ON FACILITIES RATHER LATE, I.E. AFTER CONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED BUT BEFORE DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS BEEN INTRODUCED INTO FACILITY. WHICH LEAVES AGENCY IN SITUATION OF NOT RPT NOT BEING ABLE TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOTUNDECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL MIGHT HAVE BEEN USED IN FACILITY PRIOR TO SUBMISSION OF DESIGN INFORMATION AND LISTING ON INVENTORY. BELIEVE TIMEING OF SUBMISSION OF DESIGN INFORMATION SHOULD BE TIGHTENED UP IN AGREEMENT ITSELF RATHER THAN LEFT TO SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS PER ARTICLE 42. FINALLY, THERE IS NOTHING IN ARTICLE 26 (TERMINATION) PROVIDING FOR CONTINUED SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED, USED OR PROCESSED AFTER TERMINATION BY OR THROUGH USE OF SPECIFIED MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT (OTHER THAN FACILITIES) IMPORTED PRIOR TO TERMINATION.

5. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON TEXT:

A. ARTICLE 8(A). IF THE AGENCY IS TO SAFEGUARD FACILITIES PER SE, THEN THE AGENCY NEEDS DESIGN INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE FACILITY AS WELL AS THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN IT.

B. ARTICLE 12(B) THIS PARAGRAPH WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE THE ADDITION OF PROVISIONS TO CONFIDENTIAL

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ARTICLES 92-94 TO NOTIFY THE AGENCY OF INTENDED TRANSFERS OF RELEVANT TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION (ARTICLE 98.Q) OUT OF THE STATE.

C. ARTICLE 12(C). BRACKETS ON THIS SENTENCE
HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND THE SENTENCE HAS BEEN
REWORDED TO COVER ANY TRANSFERS. MISSION AGREES
WITH ADDITION OF SENTENCE PROPOSED IN PARA 3B
OF REFTEL BUT NOTES THAT THE CURRENT DRAFT AGREEMENT,
BEING MODELED AFTER INFCIRC/153 RATHER THAN INFCIRC/66,
CONTAINS NONE OF THE INFCIRC/66 PROVISIONS FOR
ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING INVENTORIES OF IMPORTED
FACILITIES, SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT OR SPECIFIED MATERIAL.
SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, ARTICLE 5 OF INFCIRC/239, THE
FRENCH/PAKISTAN TRILATERAL.

D. ARTICLE 26. THIS ARTICLE APPLIES TERMINATION
PROVISIONS ON IMPORTED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITIES
OF RECENT TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS TO ALL
NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES WHETHER IMPORTED OR
PRODUCED INDIGENOUSLY. THE 25-YEAR MINIMUM DURATION
IS MORE STRINGENT THAN RECENT TRILATERALS ONLY WITH
RESPECT TO INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES.
AS DISCUSSED IN PARA 4, THIS ARTICLE DOES NOT PROVIDE
FOR THE CONTINUATION OF SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL
DERIVED FROM IMPORTED SPECIFIED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT
EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL
HAS BEEN PERMANENTLY INCORPORATED INTO A FACILITY
PRIOR TO TERMINATION. THE SEVERITY OF ARTICLE 26. MAY
BE PART OF THE AGENCY'S PLANNED NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY.

E. ARTICLE 30. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ADDING TO THE AGENCY'S TECHNICAL CONCLUSION A STATEMENT REGARDING EACH NUCLEAR FACILITY (OR MATERIAL BALANCE AREA) PER SE AS WELL AS NUCLEAR MATERIAL, IN RECOGNITION OF UNDERTAKINGS IN ARTICLES 1 AND 2. REGARDING FACILITIES.

F. ARTICLE 38. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EXPANDING THIS ARTICLE TO INCLUDE CASE CONFIDENTIAL.

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WHERE EXEMPTED NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS INTRODUCED INTO ANY FACILITY, INDEPENDENT OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THIS ALSO FOLLOWS FROM FACILITIES UNDERTAKINGS.

G. ARTICLE 74(F). THIS IS ONE OF SEVERAL INSTANCES WHERE REFERENCE TO FACILITIES HAS BEEN INTRODUCED BUT WITHOUT ADEQUATE ADJUSTMENT OF OTHER ARTICLE. IN THIS INSTANCE THE DRAFT FAILS TO INCLUDE A REQUIREMENT FOR SUBMISSION OF REPORTS ON FACILITY STATUS BUT REQUIRES FACILITY STATUS VERIFICATION UNDER THIS ARTICLE.

H. ARTICLE 76(A). AS NOTED PARA 4 ABOVE, THIS ARTICLE MAKES NO PROVISION FOR ACCESS TO FACILITIES WHERE NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS NOT RPT NOT REPORTED, WHEREAS ARTICLE 71(A) HAS INTRODUCED RIGHT OF AGENCY (NOT IN INFCIRC/153) TO VERIFY INFORMATION REGARDING FACILITIES PER SE.

I. ARTICLE 92. AS NOTED PARA 4 ABOVE, MISSION WOULD AGREE THAT THIS ARTICLE SHOULD BE AMENDED

TO REQUIRE NOTIFICATIONS OF TRANSFERS OUT OF STATE OF SPECIFIED MATERIAL AND SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT, AS ARTICLE 12(A) STATES.

J. ARTICLE 98.J. REFERENCES IN SUB-PARAS (A)(II) AND (B) (II) TO NON-SAFEGUARDED (NON-PEACEFUL) ACTIVITY SEEM INAPPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF ARTICLE 1 UNDERTAKING.

6. IN LIGHT AGENCY SECRETARIAT INFORMAL REQUEST FOR OUR COMMENTS, ADVISE WHETHER FOREGOING MAY BE PROVIDED INFORMALLY TO THEM. ADVISE ALSO OF ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO BE SIMILARLY PROVIDED SECRETARIAT. LABOWITZ

UNQUOTE. ROBINSON

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